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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SPEEDY TRIAL CLAUSE NOT
APPLICABLE TO TIME BETWEEN DISMISSAL OF MILI-
TARY CHARGES AND SUBSEQUENT INDICTMENT ON CI-
VILIAN CHARGES-United States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct.
1497 (1982).
INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides, in part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .... ,,I Although a
speedy trial is guaranteed by the Constitution, the Supreme Court
has dealt with this right infrequently.' In United States v. Ewell,$
the Court identified the purposes of the speedy trial clause. The
three purposes of the clause are: (1) to prevent undue incarceration
prior to trial, (2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying
public accusation and (3) to limit the possibility that a long delay
will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.4 Five years
later in United States v. Marion,5 the Court held that the right to
a speedy trial has no application until the putative defendant in
some way becomes an accused and it is only after arrest or indict-
ment that one becomes an accused.6 The factors a court should
consider in determining whether a delay violates the accused's
right to a speedy trial were first set out in Barker v. Wingo.7 These
factors are: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion of his right and prejudice to the defendant.'
The remedies for violations of the clause have traditionally
been dismissal of the indictment or vacation of the sentence.' Al-
though these remedies have been criticized as being too severe,"
the Supreme Court continues to hold that they are the only possi-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972).
3. 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
4. Id. at 120.
5. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
6. Id. at 313.
7. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
8. Id. at 530.
9. Strunk v. United States, 467 F.2d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 1972).
10. 407 U.S. at 522.
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ble remedies."
In United States v. MacDonald," the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the murder convictions of Dr. Jeffrey MacDon-
ald. The court held that the four and one-half year delay between
MacDonald's military arrest and his civilian trial violated his
speedy trial guarantee.1 8 MacDonald was arrested by the military
police on May 1, 1970 and charged with murdering his wife and
two children.1 4 On October 23, 1970, after a military investigation,
the charges were dismissed. 5 On January 24, 1975, MacDonald was
indicted by a civilian grand jury and again charged with the three
murders." He was tried and convicted in 1979.'1
Recently, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit and held that, after the military charges against
MacDonald were dismissed, he was no longer an accused, and the
sixth amendment right to a speedy trial did not apply.18 This note
will analyze the Supreme Court's holding in MacDonald"9 in view
of the purposes of the speedy trial guarantee and consider possible
alternatives to the drastic remedy of dismissal.
THE CASE
On the morning of February 17, 1970, military police at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, responded to a call for help and found that
the defendant's wife and two daughters had been clubbed and
stabbed to death.'0 The investigation that followed disclosed flaws
in the defendant's account of the crimes.' On May 1, 1970, the
11. Id.
12. 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980).
13. Id. at 261.
14. United States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1497, 1500 (1982).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 102 S. Ct. 1497.
19. Id.
20. United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196, 200 (4th Cir. 1976).
21. Id. MacDonald told police that he was awakened by screams and that
four assailants stabbed him and knocked him unconscious. The investigation by
the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID), the FBI and the local police
showed that each member of MacDonald's family had a different blood type. The
location of the blood, the presence of one daughter's blood on MacDonald's
glasses, clothing fibers, bloody pieces of surgical gloves and other evidence discov-
ered at the scene conflicted with MacDonald's alibi.
214 [Vol. 5:213
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Army formally charged him with the murders. After an extensive 22
Article 32 hearing, 8 the investigator recommended that the
charges be dismissed. 4 The Army Criminal Investigation Division
(CID) continued its investigation, however, at the request of the
Justice Department. 5 The CID presented a thirteen volume re-
port, recommending further investigation, to the Justice Depart-
ment in June of 1972.2' The CID submitted additional reports dur-
22. Id. at 200. During the hearing, which lasted for more than one month, the
government presented twenty-seven witnesses, and MacDonald presented twenty-
nine.
23. Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.), art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832
(1976):
(a) No charge or specification may be referred to a general court-martial
for trial until a thorough and impartial investigation of all the matters
set forth therein has been made. This investigation shall include inquiry
as to the truth of the matter set forth in the charges, consideration of the
form of charges, and a recommendation as to the disposition which
should be made of the case in the interest of justice and discipline.
(b) The accused shall be advised of the charges against him and of his
right to be represented at that investigation by counsel. The accused has
the right to be represented at that investigation as provided in section
838 of this title [10 USCS 838] (article 38) and in regulations prescribed
under that section. At that investigation full opportunity shall be given
to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are availa-
ble and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in
defense or mitigation, and the investigation officer shall examine availa-
ble witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded af-
ter the investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the
substance of the testimony taken on both sides and a copy thereof shall
be given to the accused.
(c) If an investigation of the subject matter of an offense has been con-
ducted before the accused is charged with the offense, and if the accused
was present at the investigation and afforded the opportunities for repre-
sentation, cross-examination, and presentation prescribed in subsection
(b), no further investigation of that charge is necessary under this article
unless it is demanded by the accused after he is informed of the charge.
A demand for further investigation entitles the accused to recall wit-
nesses for further cross-examination and to offer any new evidence in his
own behalf.
(d) The requirements of this article are binding on all persons adminis-
tering this chapter [10 USCS §§ 801 et seq.] but failure to follow them
does not constitute jurisdictional error.
24. 531 F.2d at 200. The Army granted MacDonald an honorable discharge
for reasons of hardship in December of 1970.
25. 102 S. Ct. at 1500.
26. Id.
1982] 215
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ing November of 1972, and August of 1973. 27 Following evaluation
of the reports, the Justice Department presented the case to a
grand jury in August of 1974." On January 24, 1975, the grand
jury returned an indictment charging MacDonald with the three
murders.2
Before trial the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment
claiming that the delay in bringing him to trial violated his sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial.80 The district court denied his
motion, but the Fourth Circuit allowed an interlocutory appeal and
reversed.8 1 In 1978, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Cir-
cuit. The Court did not allow the interlocutory appeal, and sent
the case back to the district court for trial."1 On August 29, 1979,
MacDonald was convicted of one count of first degree murder and
two counts of second degree murder.88 In 1980 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the convictions." The court held that
defendant's arrest by the Army triggered the protections of the
speedy trial clause, and the delay between his military arrest and
his civilian trial violated his rights under the clause.88 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and again reversed the Fourth Cir-
cuit, holding that defendant's right to a speedy trial had not been
violated.8' Relying on Marion, the Court held that since the Army
dismissed the charges against the defendant, he was not accused
until he was indicted by the grand jury in 1975.'3 Therefore, the
protections of the speedy trial clause did not attach until 1975."
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 531 F.2d 196 at 199.
31. Id. The court allowed an interlocutory appeal because of the extraordi-
nary nature of the case. The Fourth Circuit held that MacDonald's speedy trial
right had been violated.
32. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978). The Court held that a
criminal defendant could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss on speedy
trial grounds until the trial had been completed.
33. 102 S. Ct. at 1500. MacDonald was sentenced to three consecutive life
terms.
34. 632 F.2d 258. In a split decision, the Court held that under the Barker
test, MacDonald's speedy trial guarantee had been violated. The dissent agreed
that the military arrest triggered the protections of the clause but would have
reached a different conclusion under the Barker analysis.
35. Id. at 261.
36. 102 S. Ct. 1497.
37. Id. at 1503.
38. Id.
[Vol. 5:213
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HISTORY
In Klopfer v. North Carolina," the Supreme Court traced the
development of the speedy trial clause and stated, "[t]he history of
the right to a speedy trial and its reception in this country estab-
lish that it is one of the most basic rights preserved by our Consti-
tution.' 40 The Court held that the right to a speedy trial is funda-
mental and enforceable against the states by way of the fourteenth
amendment."1
In 1966 the Supreme Court, in United States v. EweU,4s iden-
tified the three basic demands of criminal justice that the speedy
trial clause is designed to protect. "This guarantee is an important
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to
trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accu-
sation and to limit the possibilities that a long delay will impair
the ability of an accused to defend himself." In addition to the
concerns of the defendant, there are also societal interests in pro-
viding a criminal defendant with a speedy trial." Lengthy pretrial
detention not only causes anxiety to the accused, but is also costly
to the government.'5 In addition, persons released on bail are free
to commit other crimes.46 A long delay can also work to the advan-
tage of the accused in that prosecution witnesses may become un-
available or their memories may fade.47
In United States v. Marion,'8 the Supreme Court determined
when the protections of the speedy trial clause attach. The Court
held that "the Sixth Amendment speedy trial provision has no ap-
plication until the putative defendant in some way becomes an 'ac-
39. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
40. Id. at 226.
41. Id.
42. 383 U.S. 116.
43. Id. at 120.
44. 407 U.S. at 519.
45. Id. at 520. "The cost of maintaining a prisoner in jail varies from $3 to $9
per day, and this amounts to millions across the Nation." The Challenge of Crime
in a Free Society, A Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice 131 (1967).
46. 407 U.S. at 519 n.8. "In Washington, D.C., in 1968, 70.1% of the persons
arrested for robbery and released prior to trial were re-arrested while on bail."
Report of the Judicial Council Committee to Study the Operation of the Bail
Reform Act in the District of Columbia 20-21 (1969).
47. 407 U.S. at 521.
48. 404 U.S. 307.
19821
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cused' . . . ."'" The Court reached its decision by examining the
sixth amendment itself, stating that the protection of the Amend-
ment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and
extends only to those persons who have been accused in the course
of that prosecution." In Marion, the defendants claimed their
speedy trial right was violated by the three year delay between the
time the government became aware of the relevant facts, in 1967,
and their indictment in 1970." The Court disagreed and held that
the speedy trial protections had not yet attached, stating that, "it
is either formal indictment or information or else the actual re-
straints imposed by an arrest and holding to answer a criminal
charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial
provisions of the Sixth Amendment." 2 In Marion, the defendants
were not arrested before the indictment in 1970. Therefore, the
protections of the speedy trial clause attached upon the indictment
in 1970, and the clause was not applicable to the three year delay
between 1967 and 1970." The Supreme Court, in both Marion and
Dillingham v. United States,54 made it clear that the sixth amend-
ment right to a speedy trial does not attach until arrest or indict-
ment, at which time the putative defendant becomes an accused.
One year after Marion, in Barker v. Wingo, 5 the Court formu-
lated the test used to determine if the post-arrest or indictment
delay violates the speedy trial clause. Since it is impossible to de-
termine exactly when the right has been denied,"6 the Court
adopted a balancing test to be applied on an ad hoc basis.57 The
Court identified four factors that should be weighed to determine
if a particular defendant's speedy trial guarantee has been vio-
lated. 8 These factors are: the length of the delay, the reasons for
49. Id. at 313.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 320.
53. Id. at 313.
54. 423 U.S. 64 (1975). In DiUingham, there was a twenty-two month interval
between the defendant's arrest and indictment and an additional twelve month
interval between indictment and trial. The Court, per curiam, emphasized that it
is either arrest or indictment that triggers the protections of the speedy trial
clause, and held that the delay between defendant's arrest and trial violated the
clause.
55. 407 U.S. 514.
56. Id. at 521.
57. Id. at 530.
58. Id.
218 [Vol. 5:213
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss1/6
SPEEDY TRIAL
the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right and the prejudice
to the defendant."
The first factor, the length of the delay, is the triggering mech-
anism. 60 There is no need to consider the other three factors until
there is some delay that is presumptively prejudicial.6 Whether
the length of the delay is presumptively prejudicial is dependent
on the particular circumstances and complexities of the case." The
weight of the second factor, the reason for the delay, also depends
on the circumstances of the case. 6 A deliberate attempt to delay
the trial is weighed more heavily against the government than a
neutral reason such as overcrowded dockets." The third factor, the
defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, is entitled to strong
consideration in determining whether the defendant has been de-
prived of that right, and failure to assert the right will make it
difficult to show a violation of the clause." The fourth factor,
prejudice to the defendant, should be examined in light of the pur-
poses of the speedy trial clause identified in Ewell."
The Barker factors should be considered together with all
other relevant circumstances, and the courts must engage in a diffi-
cult and sensitive balancing process.6 The defendant in Barker
was not tried until more than five years after he had been arrested.
The Court weighed all the factors and determined that the delay
did not violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial.6
Once a court determines that the protections of the clause
have attached under Marion, and that the clause has been violated
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 531.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 532.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 533.
68. Id. at 534. The Court stated that the five-year delay between arrest and
trial was extraordinary and that only seven months of that period was attributed
to a strong excuse, the illness of the investigation sheriff. The Court found, how-
ever, that two factors counterbalanced the deficiency. The first factor was the lack
of serious prejudice. Barker only spent ten months in jail and none of his wit-
nesses had died or become unavailable. The second, and most important factor to
the Court, was the fact that Barker did not want a speedy trial. He was gambling
on his accomplice's acquittal. The Court held that Barker was not deprived of his
speedy trial right.
1982] 219
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under the Barker analysis, the only remedy available is to dismiss
the indictment or reverse the conviction and vacate the sentence."
ANALYSIS
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held, once in 1976 ° and
again in 1980, that MacDonald's right to a speedy trial had been
violated. The Fourth Circuit held that MacDonald's military arrest
in 1970 was the functional equivalent of a civilian arrest and,
under Marion, was sufficient to trigger the protections of the
speedy trial clause, since at that point he became an accused. 72 Us-
ing the Barker analysis, the court of appeals found that the subse-
quent delay violated the defendant's speedy trial guarantee. 7 The
court held that the offending delay imposed by the government
was the lapse of time between the military arrest and civilian
trial .7 This delay was held to be sufficiently long to be considered
presumptively prejudicial and warrant inquiry into the other three
Barker factors.7 5 The court found that the delay between 1972,
when the government was in possession of all the evidence, and the
convening of the grand jury in 1974, was due to sheer bureaucratic
indifference and weighed heavily against the government.76 The
court also found that MacDonald had vigorously pursued his right
to a speedy trial.77 The fourth Barker factor, prejudice, was consid-
ered in view of the three purposes of the clause stated in EweU.
78
The court found that the possibility of prejudice to the defense at
trial is but one element, and the major evil is the personal anxie-
69. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
70. 531 F.2d 196.
71. 632 F.2d 258.
72. 531 F.2d at 203. The court held that the military arrest was the func-
tional equivalent of a civilian arrest. Both must be based on probable cause. The
fact that MacDonald was restricted to his quarters and relieved of his duties
makes this the equivalent of an arrest. If he had been restricted to his quarters
but not relieved of his duties, he would not have been considered under arrest.
73. 632 F.2d at 266.
74. Id. at 261.
75. Id. at 262.
76. Id.
77. Id. MacDonald gave statements to the CID and testified at the military
hearing. He also waived immunity and testified before the grand jury. After Mac-
Donald was discharged, he consistently contacted the Justice Department in an
attempt to expidite the disposition of charges. Id. at 263.
78. Id. at 265.
220 [Vol. 5:213
8
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss1/6
SPEEDY TRIAL
ties of the defendant caused by public accusation. 7 The court did
not require a showing of actual prejudice to MacDonald's defense
and held that the government's lackadaisical attitude in presenting
the case to the grand jury and the anxieties suffered by the defen-
dant in the interim were sufficient to violate the clause.'0
When MacDonald reached the Supreme Court, the Court ad-
dressed the question whether the time between dismissal of mili-
tary charges and subsequent indictment on civilian charges should
be considered in determining if the delay in bringing the defendant
to trial violated his rights under the speedy trial clause of the sixth
amendment.81 The Court held that this time should not be consid-
ered. After the military charges were dropped, the defendant was
no longer an accused; therefore, he was not protected by the
clause.8
The Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether the
military arrest was sufficient to invoke the clause; 83 rather, the
Court relied on the subsequent dismissal of charges in reaching its
decision. s4 When the charges were dismissed, the protections of the
clause ceased and were not revived until the indictment in 1975.85
The Court held that the interval between the indictment in 1975
and trial in 1979 did not violate the defendant's speedy trial guar-
79. Id.
80. Id. at 266.
81. 102 S. Ct. at 1499. In United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196, 204
(4th Cir. 1976), the Fourth Circuit held that the sixth amendment secures an ac-
cused's right to a speedy trial against oppressive conduct by the government in its
single sovereign capacity, regardless of the number and character of the executive
departments that participate in the prosecution. The court found that the prose-
cutions by the Army and the Justice Department were conducted by the govern-
ment in its single sovereign capacity, since both were federal tribunals. In United
States v. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1497, 1503 n.11 (1982), the Supreme Court stated
that an arrest or indictment by one sovereign would not cause the speedy trial
guarantee to become engaged as to possible subsequent indictments by another
sovereign. Therefore, an arrest by federal authorities would not toll the speedy
trial gurantee for a subsequent state prosecution of the same offense, since federal
and state authorities constitute two separate sovereigns.
82. Id. at 1503.
83. Id. at 1502 n.10. "In its petition for certiorari, the Government expressly
declined to raise the issue of whether the military investigation triggered Mac-
Donald's Sixth Amendment rights; we therefore do not express any opinion on
that issue."
84. Id. at 1503.
85. Id.
1982] 221
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antee and rbversed the Fourth Circuit.8"
The majority, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Bur-
ger, 1 relied heavily on Marion in reaching its decision. According
to Marion, the clause has no application until a defendant is in-
dicted, arrested or otherwise formally accused. 88 Although the de-
fendant was arrested by the military, the subsequent dismissal of
military charges negated his speedy trial claim since he was no
longer an accused. 9 The protections of the clause were not revived
until his civilian indictment; therefore, the time between military
dismissal and civilian indictment was not considered in evaluating
the defendant's claim.90
Delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due pro-
cess claim under the fifth amendment. 91 It may also give rise to to
a claim under the applicable statute of limitations, but no speedy
trial claim arises until charges are pending. 2 The defendant did
raise a fifth amendment due process claim, but the Court did not
consider it in this case.'3
The Court also relied on the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. 9' The
Act, which was intended to give effect to the speedy trial clause,95
states that if charges are dismissed and later reinstated, the period
between dismissal and reinstatement is not to be included in com-
puting the time within which a trial must commence." Once
86. Id.
87. Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist
and O'Connor.
88. 404 U.S. at 320.
89. 102 S. Ct. at 1502.
90. Id. at 1503.
91. Id. at 1501. In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977), the
Court held that under the fifth amendment due process clause, a defendant must
show that the delay actually prejudiced his case. The court must also consider the
reasons for the delay.
92. 102 S. Ct. at 1501.
93. Id. at 1500 n.5. MacDonald also appealed on the issue of double jeopardy.
In United States v. MacDonald, 585 F.2d 1211, 1212 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 961 (1979), the Fourth Circuit allowed an interlocutory appeal and
stated, "Since MacDonald was not put to trial before a military tribunal author-
ized to convict or acquit him, jeopardy never attached." Therefore, the fifth
amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy did not bar MacDonald's subse-
quent prosecution in federal court.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1974).
95. S. REP. No. 93-1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d), (h)(6) (1974).
§ 3161(d)(1)-If any indictment of information is dismissed upon motion
[Vol. 5:213
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charges are dismissed, the former accused is in the same position
as any other subject of a criminal investigation." Although knowl-
edge of an ongoing criminal investigation will cause stress, discom-
fort and a disruption of normal life, personal liberty is not im-
paired to the same degree as it is after arrest or indictment.91 In
MacDonald, there were no charges pending between the dismissal
of military charges in 1970 and the indictment in 1975. 9 The delay
between the indictment and trial in 1979 was caused primarily by
the defendant's own legal manuevers and was, therefore, not suffi-
of the defendant, or any charge contained in a complaint filed against an
individual is dismissed or otherwise dropped, and thereafter a complaint
is filed against such defendant or individual charging him with the same
offense or an offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same
criminal episode, or an information or indictment is filed charging such
defendant with the same offense or an offense based on the same conduct
or arising from the same criminal episode, the provisions of subsections
(b) and (c) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such subse-
quent complaint, indictment, or information, as the case may be.
(2) If the defendant is to be tried upon an indictment or information
dismissed by a trial court and reinstated following an appeal, the trial
shall commence within seventy days from the date the action occasioning
the trial becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may ex-
tend the period for trial not to exceed one hundred and eighty days from
the date the action occasioning the trial becomes final if the unavailabil-
ity of witnesses or other factors resulting from the passage of time shall
make trial within seventy days impractical. The periods of delay enumer-
ated in section 3161 (h) are excluded in computing the time limitations
specified in this section. The sanctions of section 3162 apply to this
subsection.
§ 3161(h)-The following periods of delay shall be excluded in com-
puting the time within which an information or an indictment must be
filed, or in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense
must commence:
(6)-If the information or indictment is dismissed upon motion of
the attorney for the Government and thereafter a charge is filed
against the defendant for the same offense requred to be joined
with that offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was
dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run
as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.
See also Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Hillegas, 578 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1978).
97. 102 S. Ct. at 1502.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1503.
1982]
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cient to violate the speedy trial clause. 100 Therefore, the Supreme
Court held that the clause was not violated; in fact, the clause did
not apply to the period before the indictment.10' The Court did
not reach the Barker analysis, which the Fourth Circuit had de-
cided twice in favor of the defendant.'0 2
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun,
lodged a strong dissent. 0 3 The dissenters argued that the dismissal
of military charges did not negate the speedy trial protection. In
the dissenters' opinion the entire nine year period between the mil-
itary arrest and civilian trial should have been considered in evalu-
ating the defendant's claim.'" They agreed with the Fourth Cir-
cuit's result under the Barker test and would have affirmed the
Fourth Circuit's decision.' 0 '
As the dissent states, "[a]rrest is a public act that may seri-
ously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on
bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his
financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public
obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends."'1
Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun felt that the anxiety a
defendant suffers because of public accusation does not disappear
simply because charges are temporarily dismissed'0 7 and referred
to the majority's opinion as "a disappointing exercise in strained
logic and judicial illusion."'' 08
The dissenters relied heavily on the Court's decision in
Klopfer v. North Carolina;109 Klopfer, however, presented a differ-
ent question than MacDonald. Under North Carolina criminal pro-
cedure, prior to 1973, the prosecutor was able to take a nolle
prosequi "with leave."" 0 Under this procedure the prosecutor was
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 531 F.2d 196; 632 F.2d 258.
103. 102 S. Ct. at 1504.
104. Id. at 1508.
105. Id. at 1510.
106. Id. at 1506. See also 404 U.S. at 320.
107. Id. at 1507.
108. Id. at 1510. "Suspending application of the speedy trial right in the pe-
riod between successive prosecutions ignores the real impact of the initial charge
on a criminal defendant and serves absolutely no governmental interest."
109. 386 U.S. 213.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-175 (1965) (repealed 1973).
A nolle prosequi 'with leave' shall be entered in all criminal actions in
which the indictment has been pending for two terms of court and the
224 [Vol. 5:213
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able to indefinetly suspend proceedings on an indictment."1 The
prosecutor could, without further order, have the case restored for
trial.1 2 In Klopfer, the Court held that the delay resulting from
this procedure violated the defendant's speedy trial guarantee.1"
Klopfer is not contrary to the majority opinion in MacDonald be-
cause under a nolle prosequi "with leave," the charges against the
defendant are never dismissed, and the speedy trial clause contin-
ues to apply.""
Justice Stevens concurred with the majority, but he agreed
with the dissent's opinion that the dismissal of military charges
did not suspend the protections of the speedy trial clause." 5 Ap-
plying the Barker analysis, Justice Stevens thought that the need
to proceed cautiously before deciding to prosecute such a serious
case outweighed the defendant's interest in a speedy disposition of
charges."'
Although the majority opinion did not consider the Barker
analysis, it is consistent with the Court's holdings in Marion and
Dillingham. The protections of the speedy trial clause extend only
to an accused and only after arrest or indictment does a defendant
become an accused." 7 MacDonald presented an additional issue
which the Court had not previously decided: What effect did the
dismissal of military charges and subsequent indictment on civilian
charges have on the speedy trial clause? In holding that the dis-
missal negated the clause's protection, the Court followed the in-
tent of Congress as stated in the Speedy Trial Act of 1974,1" and,
defendant has not been apprehended and in which a nolle prosequi has
not been entered, unless the judge for good cause shown shall order oth-
erwise. The clerk of the superior court shall issue a capias for the arrest
of any defendant named in any criminal action in which a nolle prosequi
has been entered when he has reasonable ground for believing that such
defendant may be arrested or upon the application of the solicitor of the
district. When any defendant shall be arrested it shall be the duty of the
clerk to issue a subpoena for the witness for the State indorsed on the
indictment.
111. 386. U.S. at 214.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 222.
114. 102 S. Ct. at 1502 n.8.
115. Id. at 1503.
116. Id.
117. 404 U.S. 307.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1974). The period between dismissal of an indictment
and reinstatement of charges for the same offense shall be excluded in computing
the time within which the trial must commence. Id. at § 3161(h)(6).
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in effect, limited the Marion decision. According to Marion, the
clause protects an accused after arrest or indictment."' According
to MacDonald, although a defendant has been arrested, he is no
longer protected by the clause if the charges are later dropped.12 0
Though never mentioned in the decision, the effect of the remedy
of dismissal may have influenced the Court in reaching its decision
to limit the clause's protection.
The remedy of dismissal is an "unsatisfactorily severe one.'" 1
In Barker, the Court stated, "This is indeed a serious consequence
because it means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious
crime may go free, without having been tried."' 22 In MacDonald, it
would have meant that a defendant who had been convicted of
murdering his family would have gone free if the Court had found
a violation of the clause. Perhaps this prospect influenced the
Court in holding as it did. If alternative remedies were available,
courts might be more willing to find violations of the clause.
In United States v. Strunk,'2 3 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals attempted to fashion a practical remedy for violations of
the speedy trial clause."2 4 The court said that the severity of the
remedy of dismissal has caused courts to be extremely hesitant in
finding violations of the speedy trial clause, and there is no reason
why less drastic relief may not be granted in appropriate cases."15
In Strunk, there was no question about the sufficiency of the evi-
dence showing guilt, and the defendant made no claim of prejudice
in the presentation of his defense.'26 The court felt that dismissal
of the indictment was inappropriate.
Rather, we think that the proper remedy is to remand the case to
the district court with the direction to enter an order instructing
the Attorney General to credit the defendant with the period of
time elapsing between the return of the indictment and the date
of the arraignment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 provides that the district
court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. We choose to
treat the sentence here imposed as illegal to the extent of the de-
119. 404 U.S. at 320.
120. 102 S. Ct. at 1502.
121. 407 U.S. at 522.
122. Id.
123. 467 F.2d 969.
124. 412 U.S. at 437.
125. 467 F.2d at 973.
126. Id.
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lay we have characterized as unreasonable. 12 7
Such a remedy would be appropriate in cases where the defen-
dant was not prejudiced by the delay. In situations where the de-
fense witnesses or evidence became unavailable because of the de-
lay, the defense would be prejudiced and dismissal would be the
only fair remedy to the defendant. The main issue in deciding
which remedy is appropriate would be prejudice. If the defendant's
case was prejudiced, dismissal would be appropriate. If not, a re-
duction of sentence would suffice.
The Supreme Court, in Strunk v. United States, 28 had an op-
portunity to adopt the remedy fashioned by the Seventh Circuit
but declined to do So.1 2 9 The Court relied on Barker and held that
dismissal must remain the only possible remedy.1 3 0
In Ewell, the Court identified the three purposes of the clause:
(1) to prevent undue incarceration prior to trial; (2) to minimize
anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and (3) to
limit the possibility that a long delay will impair the ability of an
accused to defend himself.13 1 In both Marion and MacDonald, the
Court shifted the emphasis of the clause and held that it was not
primarily intended to guard against actual or possible prejudice to
an accused's defense. " 2 The Court stated that the primary pur-
poses of the clause were to prevent undue incarceration prior to
trial and to minimize the anxiety caused by public accusation.1 3 3
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is thus not primar-
ily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by pas-
sage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Pro-
cess Clause and by statutes of limitations. The speedy trial
guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incar-
ceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless sub-
stantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while re-
leased on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by
arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.1 '
127. Id.
128. 412 U.S. 434.
129. Id. at 440.
130. Id. The Court based its finding on the rationale that denial of the right
to a speedy trial, unlike some of the other guarantees of the sixth amendment,
can not be cured in a new trial. Id. at 439.
131. 383 U.S. at 120.
132. 404 U.S. at 307; 102 S. Ct. at 1502.
133. 102 S. Ct. at 1502.
134. Id.
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Since prejudice to an accused's defense is no longer a primary
purpose of the speedy trial clause, the Strunk remedy of the Sev-
enth Circuit would appear sufficient to provide appropriate relief
for violations of the clause. A reduction of sentence would not suf-
fice if the delay has prejudiced the accused's defense, but accord-
ing to MacDonald, such prejudice is not the primary purpose of
the speedy trial clause. If a defendant can show that the delay
prejudiced his right to a fair trial, then the due process clause or
the applicable statute of limitations may provide a basis for dis-
missing an indictment. 3 5 Dismissal of an indictment or reversal of
a conviction seems too drastic a remedy for violations of the
speedy trial clause if the clause is designed to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration and to minimize anxiety accompanying pub-
lic accusation. Reducing one's sentence by the length of the unrea-
sonable delay would be better tailored to the purposes of the
clause and would be more equitable than the present remedy. With
such an alternative available, courts may be more willing to pro-
vide relief to a defendant who has suffered incarceration or anxie-
ties due to unwarranted prosecutorial delays in bringing the case
to trial.
In MacDonald, the Court did not analyze the delay under the
Barker test; instead, it restricted the scope of the clause so as not
to include the time between dismissal of military charges and sub-
sequent indictment on civilian charges. If the Court had adopted
the Strunk approach, it might have been more inclined to extend
the scope of the clause to cover the period in question and analyze
defendant's claim under the Barker test. If the Court had had an
alternative to dismissal, it might have provided defendant with
some type of relief to compensate him for the anxieties he suffered
before trial.
Under the Strunk approach, the Court could have reduced de-
fendant's sentence by the length of the unreasonable delay. The
court of appeals did not find that defendant's defense was actually
prejudiced by the delay."3 6 The court relied on the personal hard-
ships suffered by the defendant as a result of the arrest and inves-
tigation and the inability of the government to explain the delay."3 7
Therefore, reduction of sentence would have been appropriate in
defendant's case. By reducing defendant's sentence by the length
135. 404 U.S. at 326.
136. 632 F.2d at 266.
137. Id.
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of the unreasonable delay, the Court could have compensated him
for the anxieties he suffered during the delay, without reversing
the convictions and setting him free. Such an approach would ben-
efit the defendant because courts would be more inclined to pro-
vide relief, and it would also benefit society because fewer con-
victed criminals would be set free due to delays in prosecution.
CONCLUSION
In MacDonald,'38 the Supreme Court held that the time be-
tween the dismissal of military charges against the defendant and
the subsequent filing of civilian charges should not be considered
in evaluating MacDonald's speedy trial claim. The Court said that
the dismissal of the military charges negated the protections of the
clause. The protections of the clause only attach while charges are
pending. The Court relied on Marion 39 and the Speedy Trial Act
of 1974140 in reaching its decision.
The Court refused to extend the scope of the clause to cover
the period in question. Although it was not mentioned in the opin-
ion, the harsh effect of the remedy of dismissal might have influ-
enced the Court in reaching its decision. With dismissal as the only
remedy for violations of the clause, courts will be hesitant to find
infractions. If the Court had adopted the approach of the Seventh
Circuit in Strunk,'4 the goals of the clause would be better served.
Reducing sentence, in appropriate cases, is a far less drastic rem-
edy than freeing a defendant after conviction.
The Strunk'4 remedy would provide a means of compensating.
a defendant for the pretrial incarceration and hardships caused by
unwarranted prosecutorial delays, without resorting to the drastic
remedy of reversing a conviction and setting a convicted criminal
free. Such an alternative would be beneficial to society as a whole,
as well as to the individual defendants. Courts would be more
likely to analyze a defendant's speedy trial claim and provide some
type of relief.
Frank Prior
138. 102 S. Ct. 1497.
139. 404 U.S. 307.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1974).
141. 467 F.2d 969.
142. Id.
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